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This paper is a lengthier and revised version of the Closing Plenary given to the World 
Congress of the Association of Social Economics, and Cairncross Lecture, University of 
Glasgow, June, 2012. Mainstream economics is seen as unfit for purpose because of 
deficiencies that have long been criticised by a marginalised heterodoxy. These include the 
taking out of the historical and social even if bringing them back in on the basis of a technical 
apparatus and architecture that is sorely inappropriate. These observations are illustrated in 
passing reference to social capital but are particularly appropriate for understanding the 
weakness of ethics within mainstream economics. An alternative is offered through taking 
various “entanglements” (such as facts and values) as critical point of departure, leading to 
the suggestion that ethical systems are subject to the 10 Cs – Constructed, Construed, 
Conforming, Commodified, Contextual,  Contradictory,  Closed,  Contested, Collective and 
Chaotic. 
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Pleasures and honours, like troubles and cheers, seem to come in threes. I will return to 
troubles and cheers later. But I am first and foremost pleased and honoured to have been 
invited to give this lecture. Apart from any personal satisfaction, it symbolises a most 
welcome and rewarding commitment to the political economy with which I am associated, 
ranging from Marxism through to critique of mainstream economics, a commitment to 
interdisciplinarity, pluralism and theory grounded in historical and social realities.  
My second honourable pleasure comes in the form of a triple of its own. For this lecture 
follows upon past invitations to join the editorial advisory boards of both the Forum for 
Social Economics and the Review of Social Economics as well as having been asked to 
provide the first contribution to the newly established “Speaker’s” Corner in the Review, on 
the topic of economics imperialism on which I will have more to say, Fine (2008). It seems as 
if I have been adopted as a social economist with, no doubt, all the attendant trials and 
tribulations of fostering for the parents and the child alike. 
For my third, pleasurable honour, I am delighted both to be delivering the Cairncross Lecture 
and to share plenary duties with Tony Atkinson. With genuine respect and deference in light 
of their seniorities, and despite our many differences no doubt, I presume to see all three of us 
as belonging to a broad species of declining and marginalised economists whose survival is 
under threat despite or even because of the current crisis. Remarkably, it seems that 
economics – in some respects a deeply unpopular discipline – is experiencing something of a 
revival with renewed interest inspired by the faltering economy. On a personal level, Tony 
did much to support me as I embarked upon my own academic career, not least as it departed 
from orthodoxy. This gives me the chance to thank him publicly. And, whilst my career as a 
lecturer began forty years ago last autumn, my training before that, following a degree in 
mathematics, did involve much reading of the work of Alec Cairncross, whose books were 
generally compulsory for British students of economics in order to give them a feel for the 
real world that they were putatively studying. Things today are considerably different, with 
the study of mathematics substituted for that of economies, economic history, institutions and 
policy itself to which Cairncross made major contributions.  
In straddling or, as he puts it himself, alternating life as a policymaker and academic, 
Cairncross (1990, p.318) observed, “this alternation has been rather unusual in Britain but it 
ought to become increasingly common”. With minor if significant exceptions, exactly the 
opposite has occurred in the UK although the influence and rewards of academic economists 
have been a major cause of concern in the United States, giving rise to the call for a code of 
ethics for economists.1 Cairncross’ (1996) experience enabled him to draw salient lessons 
that warrant revisiting: for him, there is need for balance in the use of history, mathematics, 
models, econometrics, and different modes of argument. Interestingly, unwittingly 
anticipating Alan Greenspan’s mole-like emergence into the bright light of the real world,2 
Cairncross advises the “moral was how easily theory may lead you up the garden path” if not, 
in case of the efficient market hypotheses, the path to global crisis. Indeed, “For all these 
reasons economic history is a valuable corrective in the economist’s training”, p. 6, as it 
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extends horizons of thinking, acts as a guard against deceptiveness of facts and allows for 
otherwise inappropriately excluded factors. To a large degree, this advice has been observed 
in the breach, breaking the Cairncross the mould for economists, for the researchers, teachers 
and policymakers that might have properly observed them. And where they are observed, as 
they have increasingly been over the most recent period in a process of what I call “bringing 
back in”, it is in a distorted and improper fashion. And this, in part, is what motivates my talk 
of economics as unfit for purpose. 
But I begin more substantively with a quote that became a favourite of mine as the crisis 
broke in 2007 but which I set aside for fear of overuse. I do not apologise for resurrecting it 
once more for what I hope is an audience that is generally unfamiliar with it. Here goes:  
Banking was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin. The bankers own the earth. 
Take it away from them, but leave them the power to create money, and with the flick 
of the pen they will create enough deposits to buy it back again. However, take it 
away from them, and all the great fortunes like mine will disappear and they ought to 
disappear, for this would be a happier and better world to live in. But, if you wish to 
remain the slaves of bankers and pay the cost of your own slavery, let them continue 
to create money. 
Apart from shining a brilliant light on recent government intervention, this is a remarkably 
sharp analysis of the role of finance, even if one-dimensional of bankers versus the rest of us, 
but also one that is heavily ethical far beyond the single “ought” statement about undue 
fortunes that it contains, an issue to which I will return. But let me dwell on how I came 
across this statement.  
I was intrigued in my work on economics imperialism to discover that George Akerlof, 
together with Rachel Kranton, had begun to address the issue of “identity”, Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) for a start. Akerlof was due to deliver the Stamp Memorial Lecture at LSE in 
2007, so I decided to investigate Sir Josiah Stamp’s own identity. It turns out that in the 
1930s he became the second richest man in England, although the third son of a relatively 
humble shop owner, but had established ICI as well as leading a distinguished career in 
railways, taxation, President of the Royal Statistical Society and as a director of the Bank of 
England, being raised to a peerage in 1938, Wikipedia but see also Bowley (1941). He was 
appointed in 1939 to review resources for the war effort, and almost certainly employed 
Cairncross in his first job in government service in 1940, Cairncross (1990, p. 322). 
Stamp did, however, meet an untimely death in April, 1941, refusing to shelter either himself 
or his family against German bombing as a symbolic act of defiance, and was killed 
alongside his eldest son. According to the law of succession, it is presumed, if unknown, that 
the older dies before the younger, which means both that the second Baron Stamp holds the 
record for the shortest ever tenure of a peerage, and that estate duty had to be paid twice on 
the huge family fortune. This might be thought to raise testing ethical distributional issues. 
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But enough by way of compelling tangents. The significance of Akerlof’s account of identity 
is twofold. First is that it should derive from the author of the classic article on the market for 
lemons that gave rise, as Kuhnian examplar, to what I have called the second phase of 
economics imperialism, in its rapacious if uneven colonisation of the other social sciences by 
economics.  Second, it is itself a sort of examplar of the reduction of social science to the 
information-theoretic approach. Indeed, identity was pretty much reduced to deciding 
whether to be red or green without, it should be added, any ideological connotations attached 
to these colours. In response, I carefully bent over backwards to criticise this approach from 
within orthodoxy itself, drawing upon standard if refined material from preference theory, 
social choice theory, producer theory (the Cambridge Critique) to suggest that such 
construction of identity was formally ill-founded. Of course, this was somewhat devious in 
providing the platform for suggesting that there might be something conceptually wanting in 
such notions of identity. Despite, however, the main thrust of my piece being critical from 
within the technical formalities of the original piece by Akerlof and Kranton in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, it was returned within a day by the editor unrefereed, on the grounds 
of being of insufficient interest to its readers.3 This was the second occasion on which this 
had happened, the first being to comment on Edward Lazear’s eulogy in the QJE for Becker’s 
economics imperialism. Lazear, by the way, became chief economic advisor to the second 
President Bush. Both he and Akerlof welcomed my sending them my papers and committed 
to responding which they never did. They were ultimately published in CJE and RRPE, 
respectively Fine (2009a and 2002a).4 
I do not wish immodestly to highlight these vignettes but they serve to demonstrate two huge 
features of today’s mainstream economics. One is its combination of an extraordinarily 
narrow range of analytical principles with an equally extraordinary wide range of 
applications. The other is its total intolerance of debate outside of those principles. I do want 
to spend some time in exploring how this has come about and with what consequences. 
Significantly, this is not a history that is written by the victors but by the marginalised rebel 
armies of the vanquished who wish to restore and build upon earlier traditions within 
economics, or political economy, for the mainstream is studiously uninterested in, if not 
viciously dismissive of, the history of itself as a discipline alongside, it should be added, both 
methodology and alternatives, Fine and Milonakis (2009 and 2011) and Milonakis and Fine 
(2009) for much that follows. 
I will address this history of the mainstream by roughly identifying some stages in its 
evolution. The first is the passage from the marginalist revolution of the 1870s to the 
formalist revolution of the 1950s. The marginalist revolution set up the bare bones of what I 
term the technical apparatus of the orthodoxy as we know it today – utility and production 
functions – but also a “technical architecture” organised around a focus on equilibrium and 
efficiency.5 The formalist revolution of the 1950s, a term popularised by Mark Blaug, set in 
place both the Americanisation and mathematisation of the discipline. But crucial is that the 
passage from marginalist to formalist revolution marked the determination to squeeze out the 
maximum consequences from the deductive implications of the technical apparatus and 
architecture. And to do this, anything that stood in the way was to be sacrificed in terms of 
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method, conceptualisation (of utility, production, the nature of economics, individuals and 
goods) and even inner technical assumptions around convexity, externalities and the like.  
This meant what I will term an implosion onto the narrowest and most unrealistic of 
assumptions to achieve the pinnacle of outcomes that have continued to lie at the core of 
microeconomics. These are the Hicks-Slutsky-Samuelson conditions attached to individual 
optimisation and the Arrow-Debreu conditions for the existence (if not uniqueness and 
stability) of general equilibrium. These results symbolised the deductive outcome of the 
marginalist revolution and the bedrock for the formalist revolution. On a personal note in 
terms of its meaning the mathematisation of economics, I was recruited in 1969 from a 
mathematics department after a first degree there with a scholarship to study postgraduate 
economics, following a fishing trip in search of mathematicians by Jim Mirrlees, later Nobel 
prizewinner for economics. A degree in mathematics was deemed more appropriate for 
studying graduate economics than a degree in economics itself! 
Equally important, though, is that this technical exercise in implosion upon technique as it 
took place in the 1930s was seen to constitute only one small part of economics, even only a 
small part of individual economic behaviour itself, and it was complemented by the 
emergence of (Keynesian) macroeconomics and continuing traditions in applied economics, 
with old institutional economics remaining strong in the USA for example. In short, such 
imploding microeconomics was perceived to be totally inadequate for systemic analysis and 
certainly for application beyond the confines of supply and demand within the market.  
Our next stage, though, is the passage from the formalist revolution to the new classical 
economics of the 1970s. During this period, both macroeconomics and various and diverse 
strands of applied economics predominated over microeconomics which was, nonetheless, 
accepted as a core set of techniques even if of limited application. There was some significant 
extension of these principles in their application, to so-called human capital, public choice 
theory and the new economic history or cliometrics, for example. But these remained 
relatively confined in scope beyond these fields. 
The collapse of the post-war boom and the stagflation of the 1970s changed all of this, as 
Keynesianism was discredited and there was an increasing marginalisation of applied 
economics (which had always served as some sort of reality check on mathematical 
modelling for its own sake). Instead, the new classical economics, taking Friedman’s 
monetarist counterpart as its starting point pursued the subordination and reduction of 
macroeconomics to microeconomics, and the reduction of microeconomics itself to an 
extreme form of representative individuals, rational expectations, unquestioned presumption 
of perfectly working markets, state ineffectiveness, inferiority of all other approaches, total 
disregard for realism, and all necessary assumptions for conclusion (or starting point) of 
underlying existence of stable, efficient and unique general equilibrium, even over (real) 
business cycles. As Lucas (1987, pp. 107-8) put it as leading Nobel prizewinner of the new 
classical economics, our emphasis underlined:6 
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The most interesting recent developments in macroeconomic theory seem to me 
describable as the reincorporation of aggregative problems such as inflation and the 
business cycle within the general framework of “microeconomic” theory. If these 
developments succeed, the term ‘macroeconomic’ will simply disappear from use and 
the modifier “micro” will become superfluous. We will simply speak, as did Smith, 
Ricardo, Marshall and Walras of economic theory. 
In short, microeconomics exploded across the discipline but, as a third stage, also 
increasingly exploded across the other social sciences as well. It did so most successfully, and 
ironically, as a reaction against the extreme postures of the new classical economics. 
Imperfect information economics, most closely associated with, and promoted by, Joe 
Stiglitz, was crucial in this but it is entirely complicit with both technical apparatus and 
architecture, whilst suggesting imperfect workings of markets and institutions in light of 
asymmetric information across agents. Paul Krugman, of course, pioneered an alternative 
market imperfection economics based on increasing returns.  
Within development economics in particular, this history is marked by the passage from old 
or classic development economics through the two phases of the new development economics 
associated, respectively, with the Washington Consensus and Joe Stiglitz’s self-dubbed post 
Washington Consensus as paradigm shift. Intended or not, this has resonances with Kuhn’s 
approach to scientific revolution for which 21 different notions of paradigm have been 
identified, Fine (2002c) for a discussion. These, however, according to Kuhn himself boil 
down to three. One is an examplar, a leading piece of theory which serves as a pioneering 
archetypical example as the model for emulation and extension. Here there can be no doubt 
that Akerlof’s market for lemons is the most appropriate candidate. Another is the world 
vision for which economy and society as a sack of market and institutional imperfections, to 
which piecemeal corrections might be made, seems to fit. And third, and preferred if forced 
to choose by Kuhn himself, is a community of scientists.  
In this case, I would refer back to the Americanisation of the discipline and how it has been 
dominated by Chicago in particular to which subsequent developments have been at most a 
mild reaction if understandably exaggerated by their proponents (markets do not work 
perfectly but is this a sufficient basis for understanding the economy let alone society). On 
consulting the website of the University of Chicago in 2010, there is the claim of connections 
to 25 laureates in economics out of a total of 64 - compared, for example, with three in 
literature and sixteen in chemistry but with the latter two over a period of 108 rather than 40 
years, http://www.uchicago.edu/about/accolades/nobel/. For peace, there is just one 
connection, to Barack Obama! As we are on criteria, it is widely acknowledged that Elinor 
Ostrom is the first woman to receive the award (although a political scientist not an 
economist).7 Otherwise 60% of the economists have been of US origin, and only four 
laureates by birth or naturalisation have come from outside the USA or Western Europe 
(Arthur Lewis, Leonid Kantorovich, Amartya Sen and Robert Mundell), with corresponding 
implications for racial composition, see Wikipedia. 
 
But we are now in the latest stage of economics’ evolution, one that precedes the current 
global crisis and is independent of it although most revealing of much that has gone before. 
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For Lucas, for example, by the time, he became President of American Economic Association 
in 2003, he could claim, p. 1: 
 
My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: 
Its central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical 
purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades. 
Such views remain in Chicago even after the crisis the response to which has been along the 
lines that if there is a gap between the theory and the real world, the problem must be with the 
real world. For, consider Eugene Fama, leading and continuing proponent of the efficient 
market hypothesis, with over one-quarter of a million downloads of his academic papers. He 
continues to deny that bubbles exist or even to know what they are but is modest enough to 
confess, “We don’t know what causes recessions. Now I’m not a macroeconomist so I don’t 
feel bad about that”, Fama (2010). This has, however, to be set against the previous view of 
Lucas from the same school that macroeconomics is superfluous.  
This has all led leading econometrician Angus Deaton to suggest:8  
Economics has become like evolution, where what people think is well predicted by 
their political ideology; it is not fanciful to imagine school boards in Texas legislating 
against the teaching of Keynesian economics.  
In Chicago they do not need legislation. But, of course, as already suggested, realism of such 
economics has long been criticised. As Nobel Prize winner Bob Solow (2010) has put it in 
front of a US House Committee in terms of the macroeconomic thinking and policy over the 
neoliberal period, “An interesting question remains as to why the macroeconomics profession 
led itself down this particular garden path.” Indeed, as an old style neoclassical Keynesian, 
Solow has put it more amusingly in response to the dominance of neoliberal economics and 
policymaking and its extraordinary esoteric development of mathematical and statistical 
technique at the expense of realism:9 
Suppose someone sits down where you are sitting right now and announces to me that 
he is Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I want to do with him is to get involved in a 
technical discussion on cavalry tactics at the Battle of Austerlitz. If I do that, I’m 
getting tacitly drawn into the game that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. 
Even Milton Friedman lost patience with the developments in economics that he had done so 
much to spawn, bemoaning the discipline had become “an arcane branch of mathematics”. 
Despite these criticisms and differences within neoclassical economics around market 
perfection or not, the core microeconomic technical apparatus and architecture (and 
associated methods) have been strengthened in the most recent period. This is so much so that 
the latest stage is one in which they have been more or less indiscriminately attached to any 
other factor, theory or subject that takes the discipline’s fancy. This is truly “freakonomics”, 
my favourite example being the newly-founded field of neuroeconomics, heavily in fashion, 
and, to parody, wedded to the notion that the key to economics can be found by study inside 
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the representative individual’s head! I do not have the time to expose this mental activity to 
you but would observe that the willy-nilly application of microeconomic principles gives rise 
to a paradox. Economics can as a result change very quickly but without essentially changing 
at all. Further, whilst in the passage from marginalist to formalist revolution there was some 
sensitivity to what was being discarded in the implosion involved, with the current explosion 
of economics imperialism across the social sciences, there is no second thought at all.   
Indeed, currently, the mainstream is so secure in its analytical principles, its technical 
apparatus and technical architecture or TA-squared, that it promiscuously if not universally, 
draws upon whatever else it likes without regard to the conceptual or logical consistency 
involved. This is so in the past, for example, in bringing back in all those elements that were 
taken out in the implosion that marked the passage from the marginalist to the formalist 
revolution. And, equally, previously, what are now standard elements in the economists 
toolkit – such as game theory – were appropriately treated with suspicion for their destructive 
implications for the consistency and meaning of notions such as rationality (because of 
interdependencies in preferences, strategies and meanings to individuals). And, of late, 
anything behavioural goes although this is a challenge to where rationality begins and ends. 
Such restless meanderings across the social, and even physical, sciences for fragments of 
analytical content have arguably fed illusions about economics as a discipline even amongst 
its critics. For those such as Colander, for example, it signifies the end of the mainstream as it 
is destroyed from without around its frontiers. And for the critical realists, lead by Tony 
Lawson, the mainstream’s only enduring substance is its closed, deterministic methodology. I 
suspect both of these are profoundly incorrect for overlooking the extent to which TA-
squared remains at the heart of the mainstream whatever bionic elements are grafted on from 
elsewhere. And, it is worth observing, that this unyielding core in the mainstream remains as 
strong as ever despite its own unconsidered weaknesses which ought, at least in principle, be 
even more cruelly exposed the more they are incoherently combined with notions drawn from 
disciplines with sounder and different methodological and conceptual predispositions.10  
Now, of course, the indiscriminate application of TA-squared is conducive to familiar jokes 
about economists – the Nobel prizewinner opening the can of beans on the desert island by 
assuming he! has a tin opener; the economist searching for keys under the lamp post even 
though they were not lost there because it is the only place he can see; and the TA-squared as 
like giving a toy hammer to a child who then proceeds to treat everything as if it were a nail. 
The only development to which I am now pointing is that the economist has been given the 
key to the entire tool shed and has set about rewriting the entirety of social science with the 
plumber’s monkey wrench and the like, with as little or less success than the monkey on a 
typewriter has with the works of Shakespeare.  
This is indicative of an extraordinary inner strength and confidence of the mainstream. Let 
me through, I am an economist, I can explain anything and everything – freakonomics gone 
crazy. But it is also indicative of weaknesses – one is an explicit recognition that its founding 
principles are inadequate unless supplemented by all and sundry; another is, as remarked, to 
be potentially subject to devastating criticism from other perspectives once its own are 
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exposed – which is why economics does not and cannot take methodology, history of 
economic thought or heterodox alternatives seriously (or, indeed, its own talisman of science 
and rigour); and the mainstream is also marked by a lack of overall vision with corresponding 
policy thrust (such as Keynesianism) lest it be neoliberal by default. For the mainstream has 
increasingly not only hollowed out its own analytical and policy perspectives, it has done 
much the same to its alter ego in heterodoxy so marginalised has it made the latter. 
Neoliberalism gets both the orthodoxy and the heterodoxy it deserves but it is at our and the 
economy’s and the discipline’s expense. And so dull. If the devil has the best tunes, he 
certainly is no orthodox economist even if he has created a black hellhole within the social 
sciences.  
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to see the mainstream as founded exclusively on piecemeal 
micro-foundations as the means by which to bring back in the historical and the social. For 
the same can be done in a wholesale fashion. The single most prominent avenue by which 
this has been done is through appeal to institutions, not least through the new institutional 
economics. Significantly, this has its origins in the new economic history and the work of 
Douglass North, inspired by and inspiring others to apply the principle of pricing to the sub-
discipline, leading to the pricing of principle as a way of inappropriately explaining why 
ideologies change even though those yet to emerge are chosen before they have been known 
and experienced. Equally significantly, institutions have become endowed with the character 
of a residual theoretical and empirical character, explaining what has otherwise proven 
elusive. 
In parallel with institutions, a distinct residual explanatory factor has also emerged, if later 
and differently in the form of social capital. This is a genus of the species of capitals that 
have been offered to augment explanation, starting with physical and moving through human, 
natural, personal capitals, to form what has been termed a plethora of capitals, the most recent 
being, for example, mental capital and erotic capital. But social capital is a bit special as it 
tends to serve as an umbrella for all of the others, and has been defined and measured in 
hundreds of ways – owning a pet is my current favourite - with an even larger and expanding 
range of applications.  
Now, unlike institutions that have primarily been home-grown within economics, social 
capital has been imported from outside. It has had a meteoric rise across the social sciences 
over the past twenty years, and it continues to invade new disciplines and topics. You may or 
may not know much about social capital. I have myself been an obsessive critic for almost 
twenty years now, having written something like half a million words on the topic, and read 
thousands of contributions, see especially Fine (2001 and 2010a). I will not, and cannot, run 
through all of my objections but, as the notion finds its way into our conference themes, let 
me offer at least a selective taste or two. First, social capital has been shown to be the most 
wonderful panacea for more or less everything, in scholarship as well as within the real 
world. From across the literature on social capital and health, for example, bearing in mind 
that you yourselves will be building social capital by your presence here today, you will also 
benefit by improvement in mental and self-reported health, health at work, life satisfaction 
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and well-being, and in your children’s health; it will offer lower risk of violence, accidents, 
suicide, coronary heart disease, cancer, teenage pregnancy and “risky” and pre-marital sexual 
activity, fatalism, being overweight, chances of drug (ab)use (apart from cannabis!) and 
addiction (but enhance successful withdrawal), being a depressed mother of young children, 
low birth weight of children, excessive alcohol consumption, and so on. Social capital is truly 
a wonder drug. It even guards against toothache. 
But I also want to give examples of where social capital does not go – it tends to overlook 
trade unions, power and conflict, and the elite, global and national, and their flick of the pen. 
I know of no social capital study that has looked at the power of finance. Is it accidental that 
Robert Putnam, the great populariser of  social capital, and the single most cited author across 
the social sciences in the 1990s, should bemoan the decline of US social capital for TV-
watching without observing that the top 1% of earners increased their share of income from 
below 10% to over 20%? It is especially ironic that de Tocqueville should be appealed to for 
the loss of American associationalism, for his overlooked emphasis was on how heavily this 
was promoted by egalitarianism. Yet, it only takes a group of econophysicists using network 
analysis to establish that a group of less than 150 MNCs, through a complicated web of 
ownership, essentially run the world economy, Vitali et al (2011).11 Of these, three-quarters 
are banks. Incidentally, this exercise is cited by Alan Kirman (2012) in making the case that 
perhaps representative individuals are not the way in which to address the economy. 
Social capital was, of course, dear to the Third Wayism of the Blair-Brown governments in 
the UK (1997-2010). And it had a social capital unit in the Cabinet Office whose chief policy 
analyst was David Halpern. By chance, we met for a second time, after a previous debate on 
social capital and race organised by the Rowntree Trust, when asked by Laurie Taylor on his 
programme Talking Allowed to debate social capital following the publication of my new 
book, Fine (2010a). Ever courteous, I asked him what he was doing, and he informed that he 
was head of research at the new Institute for Governance. “How was it funded?”, I innocently 
enquired. Unblushing, he answered Lord Sainsbury whom you will know of as a major 
superstore owner and Labour Cabinet Minister. Now, that’s what I call social capital. In 
August 2010, Halpern is imploring us to “Give the big society a break” since “Times are 
hard, but Cameron's idea could unlock the ‘hidden wealth’ in our communities”. No doubt he 
had found a way to tap this not so deeply hidden wealth. For it only needs to be added that he 
is “currently on secondment to both No.10 and the Cabinet Office full time to head the 
Behavioural Insight Team, and support on the Big Society and wellbeing agendas”, 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/08/give-the-big-society-a-break/  The Big Society 
is simply social capital in coalition garb and just as much a smokescreen for proper analysis 
and policy. 
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Such ad hominem arguments are, no doubt, out of place in an academic context although they 
do represent my revenge on the conference themes. I am often taken as extreme for arguing 
for total critical rejection of social capital on analytical grounds but also on intellectual 
strategic grounds of how its more progressive and well-founded uses are either marginalized 
or merely serve selectively as devices of repressive tolerance. In short, my posture is one that 
is first and foremost based upon the extraordinary extent to which social capital has digested 
and degraded whatever it touches, for which the McDonaldisation of social science is the 
most appropriate epithet. Interestingly, social capital (and the new institutional economics) 
tend to leave us with impoverished accounts of both the social and individuals who remain 
soulless creatures, even if empty canvases on which any number of departures from self-
interest can or cannot be incorporated (as with the account of identity by Akerlof and 
Kranton). So I leave social capital with my vulgarized version of Philip Larkin’s poem, and a 
plea for intellectual and personal integrity in your scholarship.12 Otherwise, go and work for a 
bank, the Cabinet Office or Rupert Murdoch, see below. 
 
But at least I have been directed towards the conference themes, and will move to ethics in 
particular. Here, I have to confess that I am not personally keen on ethics as a field of study, 
especially if pursued abstractly at the level of principle; I have limited knowledge, and think 
of it much as I do art and culture (i.e. paintings and music) or even methodology in the 
academic world. I probably do know more than I am aware but with plenty of space for 
ignorance: I do not organise what I do know consistently or coherently, and I know what I 
like and what I do not like but have not probed why this should be so in detail. Let me take 
you on another digression. I currently Chair a Working Group of the Social Science Research 
Unit of the UK’s Food Standards Agency, and we are investigating how regulation of meat 
slaughtering should be reformed – you will not be surprised to learn that the sponsors of the 
Big Society first took both food labelling and diet away from the FSA (which had a 
reputation for being anti-corporate), and is pressing for corporate self-regulation and cost 
recovery in the food chain – let us eat meat, uncontaminated no doubt in light of the self-
interest of the butcher as Adam Smith would have it. You probably do not know that current 
legislation requires a qualified vet or equivalent to be present at the slaughter of every animal, 
costing something in the region of £100 million per annum with, if exaggerating, as much 
chance of catching modern forms of contamination such as BSE as the carcases putting up 
their hooves as a sign of guilt. I was faced with deciding on whether to go on a 
slaughterhouse visit or not. I decided against on the grounds that this would turn me into a 
vegetarian and I did not want to become a vegetarian.13 
 
Of course, this is the Ulysses and the Sirens syndrome. I also support England when they play 
soccer and can rationalise this on the grounds that, if they win and progress, I will gain more 
enjoyment from knowledge of the team in next rounds. But, if I am honest and if I probed 
deeper, I might not find what I like, so I do not probe deeper and just take the enjoyment 
alongside my animal diet and unjustifiable patriotism. But I am fairly certain such illegitimate 
protective devices are not what motivates my antipathy to ethics (and economics). This I can 
pinpoint from the type of argument that I encountered when reviewing a book by Gerry 
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Cohen on justice and equity, Fine (1997a).14 Here we have to deal with whether an inequality 
of sight caused by the random dropping of eyeballs from a tree into empty eye sockets would 
be a (dis)advantage that should or should not be compensated if not ethically justified. I do 
not deny that ethical insights might be gained from such exercises but they are not of interest 
to me to pursue, either for their intellectual rewards or, possibly, for their strategic purpose in 
power of persuasion. 
 
But the situation with mainstream economics is different. Here, I can point to another triple. 
For not only were the historical and the social taken out of mainstream economics in the 
passage from the marginalist revolution but also the ethical. This is surely uncontroversial, at 
least in intent as reflected in the rise of positive economics following Lionel Robbins’ appeal 
for a value-free economics (although resistance should not be overlooked). For, of course, 
homo economicus is as unethical as single-minded in pursuit of self-interest.15 Now, it is 
apparent that the mainstream could not survive if it interrogated its ethics. TA-squared and 
ethics are, other than on an extremely narrow terrain, entirely incompatible with one another, 
not least for the nature of humanity that the mainstream projects in its narrow individualism. 
It would be impossible for homo economicus to survive a field trip to the slaughterhouse of 
ethics - any more than it can countenance methodology, history of economic thought and 
debate with alternatives - without becoming a vegetarian. As Evensky (2012, p. 4) seeks to 
demonstrate with the following table, ethics and the like are not on the agenda.  
Number of Times Each Term Appeared in the AEA Papers and Proceedings of a Given Year 
Term /Year  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  
Ethic*  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Moral  0  0  0  0  0  3****  
Virtue  0  0  0  0  1***  0  
Justice  0  0  0  0  0  1  
Equality** 2  1  1  2  3  2  
* Captured possible cases: Ethics or Ethical  
** Captured possible cases: Equality or Inequality  
*** Title: “Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States”  
**** All in a session titled “Economics as a Moral Science” 
This is not to say that ethics too has not been brought back into economics, in which Amartya 
Sen, my Phd supervisor, has most notably taken the lead, not least initially with his 
contributions to the study of social choice, inequality and freedom. But, as his work has 
evolved to incorporate entitlements, capabilities, development and freedom, and to the extent 
that it moves beyond an individualistic framework, it has increasingly moved in parallel with 
the mainstream with limited points of contact – and, possibly more important, as inequality 
has expanded enormously over the past few decades within the USA and elsewhere, 
inequality has gone off the agenda. When I was first a graduate student, it was hot stuff, not 
least in the theory and ethics of measurement. A classic contribution was made by Tony, with 
his Atkinson (1970) index, in which individual income was scaled by an exponent epsilon 
before being added over all individuals and aggregated to give a measure. Essentially for 
different distributions of a given income, comparison is made of for different distributions: 




summing over individuals i, with inequality aversion parameter ε. The lower epsilon, the 
more those on lower incomes would be favoured. In my own contribution, I pointed to a 
hidden assumption in this procedure – that whilst the intensity of income for individuals was 
being rescaled, each individual was being treated as equivalent. We can drop this symmetry 
axiom and retain all others, so that we can also weight some individuals more or less than 
others for whatever reason, Fine (1985 and 1996). Hence, without bi necessarily, all equal (to 
one), comparisons are instead made of: 
 bi yiε 
In other words, we are now engaged in an exercise of both intra-personal and (implicit) 
inter-personal measurement. I was able to show, hardly surprisingly, that weighting higher 
intra-personal income by less is equivalent to weighting inter-personally less to those who 
are on higher income.  
So what? Well, the results are equivalent but the ethics are very different from one another. 
How we judge one individual as opposed to another has no bearing on how we treat the same 
individual as he or she is wealthier or not. But the crucial point is, we cannot make these 
judgements, or take them further without knowing something about the individuals 
themselves – how did they get their income, is their capacity for pleasure enhanced by 
income and, if so, why and how, and if not is this because of disability, depression, satiation, 
potential as yet unfulfilled, and so on.  
This suggests to me at least that what we need is a material culture of ethics: that it be 
grounded in material realities as opposed to metaphysical argument. For the latter, we can 
have the sort of epsilon trade-offs highlighted above not least as we can always bring down 
any principle by putting it up against another in an artificially constructed contest in which 
the first only prevails at the expense of an undesirable outcome. As the politician, desperate 
to be elected, puts it, “These are my principles and, if you don’t like them, I will change 
them”.  
How then might we build an ethical system with some application within economics? I did 
some investigation by perusing the Conference papers of the newly-founded World 
Economic Association. These fell into four categories: the theory and practice of ethics; is 
economics really a positive science?; should economics have an ethical content?; and what 
constitutes ethical conduct for economists? I must confess, at the expense of alienating 
numbers of authors with a single remark, on top of social capitalists, that I did not find much 
inspiration.16 And, yet, against a self-confessed state of ignorance and antipathy, and under 
the motto that fools rush in where angels fear to tread, I now set about offering not so much 
an ethical system as an approach for such. I do so by drawing upon a framework previously 
developed for my work on the material culture of consumption.17  
Before doing so, I make reference to a much more promising source of inspiration, although 
only first accessed after drafting this lecture. The edited collection of Putnam and Walsh, The 
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End of Value-Free Economics, in which their own contributions from past and present are to 
the fore, does what it says on the tin. In many ways, it paves the way for, and justifies my 
contribution. For this, and many other reasons, it is as much imperative reading for 
mainstream economists as it is unlikely to become so.18 They argue that a value- (and hence, 
more narrowly defined ethical-) free economics is impossible despite claims, and presumed 
practice of, the mainstream to the contrary. So, adding ethics to a value-free positive 
economics is not an option. Significantly, they nail a sheaf of mainstream misapprehensions, 
if not errors, confirming my more general dictum that the mainstream defends and even 
promotes its own flaws by treating them as if they were virtues (surely an ethical content if 
ever there was one). First is to observe that with its self-image (as if natural science), the 
mainstream departs from what has long been established in the philosophy of science, that 
values and predictive or analytic theory cannot be separated. Thus mainstream economics is 
the exact antithesis of (physical) science in this regard, even more so in so far as it deals with 
the social as opposed to the physical world.19 In short, p. 207: 
Neoclassical economists have for many years been using arguments, borrowed from a 
long discredited philosophy of science, to the effect that, while welfare economics 
carries an ineradicable taint of values, “predictive” or “analytical” economic theory 
does not. 
Second, in particular, the dichotomies between fact and value, fact and convention, and 
analytic and synthetic analysis are not sustainable. This leads to their stronger proposition 
that not only is value-free economics impossible but welfare economics should not be 
constituted as a separate field of study. I am not convinced of the latter as opposed to 
acknowledging that values always impinge upon our economics and vice-versa. But this does 
mean we have to wear our values, or critically expose them, at all times or, indeed, as with a 
properly constituted welfare economics, on occasion expose them deliberately (that is 
identifying not denying values as opposed to applying them as an external imposition). We 
can, after all, proceed with concepts such as marginal utility or exploitation whilst accepting 
but not explicitly dissecting their ethical content. Putnam and Walsh do, however, reveal how 
the mainstream’s reluctance even to engage in interpersonal comparisons (following 
Robbins), of the sort discussed above in Atkinson-type measures, has acted as a cordon 
sanitaire around delving deeper into the values of economics. The major exception has been 
Sen whose contributions have taken such comparisons as point of departure for a journey to 
freedom and beyond, even if mainstream economists have thrown themselves overboard 
along the way (in a wash of deductive application of technique around measuring inequality, 
etc). 
Third, more constructively, Putnam and Walsh place some emphasis on the “entanglement” 
across convention (presuppositions), fact and value, with the corresponding need to situate 
ethics contextually. In doing so, however, their contributions do continue to betray their 
origins in the philosophy of science - with relatively limited contextual (or social and 
historical) situating of the ethics of the mainstream (but for its claimed freedom from values) 
nor through constructing an economic ethics for (contemporary) capitalism. One exception is 
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to point critically to the individualism of Sen’s entitlement approach as opposed to their 
preferred, and compelling, case for a macro-approach;20 and another is to offer a return to 
classical political economy, the economics of surplus, and a strong if partially idiosyncratic 
attachment to the economics of Pasinetti as the contemporary representative of Adam 
Smith.21 
Significantly, other contributions in the vein of Putnam and Walsh have further extended 
what needs to be incorporated into an ethical economics. Sen looms so large in such an 
enterprise that such extensions can be seen as highlighting what he has himself added as well 
as what he has omitted (or somewhere in-between by suggesting he has implicitly or 
unconsciously deployed the various extra elements). Sen’s own trajectory from the 
technicalities of social choice theory and measurement of inequality, through famine, 
entitlements and capabilities to freedom has inevitably expanded his discursive and 
substantive content in this respect (Fine 2002b). For Martin’s (2007 and 2011), this involves 
specifying and distinguishing the ontologies and epistemologies of capabilities as well as the 
descriptive and prescriptive approaches to ethics. He also sees Sen as deconstructing the 
(rational) utility function just as the surplus, Cambridge tradition deconstructs the production 
function.22 For Smith and Seward (2009), the specification of capabilities has been short on 
contextual, contingent meaning, together with a proper specification of the social and 
relational as opposed to the individual, and the relative roles of structure and agency. And 
Oosterlaken (2011) insists upon the technological foundations of capabilities (not least the 
material artefacts by which we access them). 
To some degree, and necessarily in retrospect, my own tentative suggestions for an ethics of 
economics might be seen as both drawing upon all of these “entanglements” derived from 
Putnam and Walsh and followers, and bringing out further the social, material and 
contradictory elements in the context of capitalism. A prior issue, though, is whether we can 
be confident that we have a full list of such entanglements ex ante, in parallel with the desire 
to list entitlements, capabilities, basic needs, freedoms, and so on. Precisely because our 
ethics need to be both materially and contextually grounded, so we need to leave open how 
and over what they are entangled. Accordingly, I organise my approach around what I have 
termed the “ten Cs”. First, an ethical system is Constructed. In a postmodernist era of 
deconstruction, this is hardly controversial, apart from for economists who have yet even to 
enter the modernist domain of reaction against rationalism and a (false) realism. But my 
notion of ethics as constructed is one that attaches it to a dialectic between material realities 
and how they are reproduced and reflected upon in thought. As Berthold Brecht put it, “Grub 
first, then ethics”. But this is not merely a recipe for survival, it is also an imperative in 
understanding the nature, sources and content of ethics itself.  As a first corollary, it is 
immediate how nonsensical it is to conceive of a value-free economics or, indeed, almost 
anything, and what is interesting is not to debate such a proposition as to expose the material 
and intellectual circumstances that would lead to such a belief and its more or less successful 
promotion. To conceive the economy in terms of homo economicus is dripping in ethical 
content that is in need of critical exposure, as indeed was realised by Thomas Carlyle in 
dubbing the discipline the dismal science albeit from an entirely reactionary perspective. 
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But, of course, I must not swing too far and see ethics as merely the reflection of material 
realities. Ethics are Construed if not, to coin a phrase, in circumstances made by the 
construer. I read somewhere of a judge in the south of the ante-bellum USA who refused to 
allow slave owners to cross the threshold of his plantation on the grounds of owning slaves 
being a crime against human nature. This is both remarkably brave and modern for his time 
and circumstances. But, to my mind if not to consequentialism, the gloss on his principles 
dulls a little once we know that he refused the wearers of wigs from entering his property on 
the same grounds – I cannot imagine how infuriated he would have been by a wig-wearing 
slave owner, such as George Washington so symbolic of American freedom! This, however, 
illustrates how ethics are irreducibly attached to how we understand human nature itself, and 
this is open to interpretation with differing meanings and emphasis, presumably one for today 
in which slave owning and wig wearing are not some sort of equivalent crime against our 
species. 
But whilst, for the reflexive individual, construal is always open, it is also inevitably 
Conforming. By this, I do not mean that it is necessarily rigidly determined to be orthodox 
however that itself might be determined, (or even as Conventional which I take to be a false 
C). Rather, whilst conventional ethics (or ethical conventions), like conventional wisdoms, 
are often uncritically accepted, the boundaries and even language of our ethics are 
constrained (or Constrained?) even in opposition to the standard mores. Do you or do you not 
accept the Pareto efficiency criteria, for example, carries with it an extraordinarily heavy load 
of analytical and ethical baggage.  
And, in particular, the conformity of ethics (of economics) is heavily if by no means 
exclusively attached to Commodification. Again, by commodification of ethics, I do not 
mean they are up for sale or subject to cost-benefit analysis although this is what inspired 
Douglass North’s first phase of institutional economics as he moved from the neoclassical 
principle of pricing to the pricing of principle as a way of getting a handle on ideology, Fine 
and Milonakis (2003). You believe in what is in your interest to believe in. This is, of course, 
far from true of individuals let alone the determinants of ideology. Yet the dictates of the 
commodity system heavily influence the way in which we can and do think about ethics as 
well as the ones we adopt within that way of thinking, not least in North’s flawed and now 
discarded first steps towards a new institutional economics. 
As should be apparent by now, ethics are also Contextual. What is considered, from wigs to 
slaves, as well as how ethics are and can be conceived is deeply bound to the society and 
material practices under consideration – from plantation labour to being hirsuitely challenged.  
And such construction, construal, conforming, commodification and context are necessarily 
marked by how society both is and how it is evolving and are, consequently, Contradictory, 
not purely or primarily in terms of clash of ethical principles, but in the dialectical sense of 
incorporating a response to underlying forces for change at more complex and evolving 
levels, however these are understood. As the world is dynamic in its globalisation, 
financialisation, Polanyian double movements, or whatever, replete with tensions and 
dynamism, so this must be reflected in our ethics, even if by way of omission. 
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Yet, it is crucial to recognise that ethics are Closed, not so much in principle but certainly in 
practice. What gets put on the ethical agenda, who gets to debate it, when and how, and with 
what meanings? This point is ideally illustrated by the prominence of value-free economics, 
with extraordinary implications for closing debate around the ethics of economics and the 
economy as an enduring characteristic of the discipline. 
Nonetheless, ethics are Contested in terms of what, how, and by and for whom. We differ 
over the weight to be assigned between and within ethical principles. And, it is one of the 
enduring aspects of social science in general, and of ethics in particular, that it should 
proceed by critically observing how certain constituencies and issues have been overlooked 
in order to force them into consideration – whether it be race, gender, the poor, future 
generations and even extending to animal rights. 
Contesting ethics is equally a reflection of Collective participation in their construction, with 
different forms of organisation and influence, and with different interest groups having 
different levels of, and access to, influence. The social capital, if I may, of the Americanised 
discipline of mainstream economics is a striking example of this despite its self-professed 
individualism. For Margaret Radin (1996), in her book, Contested Commodities, the 
argument is put forward that the treatment in the economics and law, inspired by economics 
imperialism, has the effect of producing attitudes to sexual assault as if it were reducible to a 
violation of property with correspondingly damaging effects on incidence. A rather different 
but classic example of collective ethics is the Gift Relationship of Richard Titmuss (1970), 
and the free donation of blood in the UK that is more effective in soliciting supply than if it 
were paid for. I am an example myself. I would not have given blood if I were paid for it just 
as I will not submit to journals that charge for submission nor referee for those that pay for 
review since I consider these to be a collective intellectual responsibility. Of course, there are 
those who hold different views, especially those academics who receive huge fees for 
promoting the liberalisation of financial markets, secure in the certainty that if someone is 
willing to pay so much for this knowledge, that is what it must be worth with the added 
comfort that Gresham’s law of the bad driving out the good money from circulation does not 
apply to knowledge any more than it does to efficient markets. The ethics of such plutonomy 
within the economics profession has been cruelly exposed, especially within the United 
States.23 It is complemented by an ethics of agnotology, the more or less deliberate spread of 
ignorance about matters economic.24 
Last, as a consequence of the other Cs, ethical systems are Chaotic. Being subject to 
multiplicities of influences, forms and interpretations, ethics necessarily lacks coherence, 
consistency and clarity (so these cannot be added as further Cs!). Of course, this does not 
imply that there is neither rationale nor explanation for ethics, nor that moral philosophers 
may seek to impose coherence. Rather, ethics are inevitably subject to more or less 
progressive tensions and resolutions. Indeed, in this world of horrendous inequalities and 
oppressions, it is inconceivable to me how anybody could survive for a moment with even the 
slightest degree of ethical principles without being caught in a chaotic mire. We can only 
survive by avoiding living by our ethics, at least selectively, which is, of course, why we are 
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inclined to admire those who are to a greater degree ethically principled – at least in the 
directions of which we approve. 
I have tried to be positive and constructive about ethics and (mainstream) economics despite 
my antipathy to each when taken individually in isolation from the other. But I am not 
optimistic of prospects for change within the discipline, even if the two are combined, 
precisely because of its lack of critical self-examination and openness to alternatives. Let me 
illustrate this element of being unfit for purpose through a simple exercise I made last year in 
light of the opprobrium attached to economists for their failure to predict a crisis, even to 
allow for its possibility. I undertook a google scholar search for crisis in economics or the 
like. I came up with 115 entries, most referring back to a dispute of eighty years ago around 
Schumpeter. By contrast, the similar search for sociology for purposes of comparison came 
up with 7230 entries, the majority far more contemporary. Yet, no one is blaming the 
sociologists for the crisis! 
Yet, should hope spring eternal and anticipate a potential renewal of the social, the historical 
and the ethical within economics. Let me begin to conclude by taking you back 170 years. At 
that time, Britain had passed legislation to abolish slavery in the Empire; it passed a factory 
act to protect children workers; Charles Darwin had just completed his voyages around Latin 
America and the Galapagos Islands; the penny post was introduced in Britain; and Chicago 
had just been founded as a village of 200 inhabitants. The end of slavery, the protection of 
children, the theory of evolution, and Chicago are all now taken for granted. In 1843, a 
newspaper was also founded in the UK, the News of the World, and was both taken for 
granted and became the most popular newspaper in the UK. It printed its final edition in 2011 
– it was deemed unfit for purpose at least for the Murdoch media empire of News 
International because of phone hacking and corruption of police through bribery. But, by 
comparison to those of economics, its crimes are surely minor.  
For, significantly by way of example, consider the Nobel prizes for economics in 2011. 
Discreetly avoiding the recently favoured if now tainted terrain of finance, they were awarded 
to three mainstream economists who study unemployment as a mismatch in search or trust 
between those who want to give jobs and those who want to take them. As Yannis Varoufakis 
(2010) puts it: 
Imagine a world ravaged by a plague, and suppose that the year's Nobel Prize for 
Medicine is awarded to researchers whose whole career is based on the assumption 
that plagues are impossible. The world would have been outraged. That is precisely 
how we should feel about yesterday's announcement of the recipients of the 2010 
Nobel Prize … Interestingly, these three fine mathematical economists have one thing 
in common, other than their work on labor markets: in their voluminous theoretical 
output on unemployment and the like, there is not a smidgeon of a hint, of a mention, 
of an economic crisis which may boost unemployment in every sector and for all 
types of workers.  Not one!  
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Of course, the News of the World loved and prospered on a good sex scandal to which I 
would myself never stoop so low, and it is as well to remember that the Sun never sets on the 
News International Empire, not least as the News of the World was reborn as the daily Sun 
on Sunday. But as Dominique Strauss-Kahn declared of Tunisia and Egypt and the Arab 
Spring, days before his abrupt removal from office, the macroeconomic figures were quite 
good but distribution of income and (youth) unemployment had been overlooked. I have tried 
to explain why – not as an accident but as the tip of an iceberg of an economics that is as 
much in need of transformation as the News of the World.  
To parody: 
Mainstream economics was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin. The orthodoxy 
owns the social, the historical and the ethical. Take it away from them, but leave them 
the power over the discipline, and with the flick of the pen they will create enough 
models to bring them back in again. However, take it away from them, and all the 
flawed posturings will disappear and they ought to disappear, for this would be a 
happier and better world to live in. But, if you wish to remain the slaves of the 
mainstream and pay the cost of your own slavery, let them continue to create their 
models. 
In short, economics is unfit for purpose across so many dimensions that it is hard to know 
where to begin to remedy it. My eleven-year old daughter tells me that I need to be more 
patient with her. My response is that she gives me plenty of practice. And much the same 
applies to economics. If it can be made fit for purpose through an ethical economics or social 
economics more generally, all power to your elbows. So, in final conclusion, let me offer one 
final triple, of cheers – one cheer for ethical economics, one cheer for social and historical 
economics, and the last and loudest cheer for an alternative economics fit for purpose. 
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18 It is, of course, a sad truth that most heterodoxy is read by those who have less need of it 
and ignored by those that have most.  
19 Further, because “the whole treatment of neoclassical economics’ core concept of 
rationality (for example) is shown to be loaded with both epistemic and ethical values, the 
impossibility of such a separation should be unmistakably clear”, p. 210. Significantly, 
Putnam in particular has long been active in the philosophical foundations of mathematics, 
and served as a major support in this regard to my own “proof” on how ill-founded 
mathematically is methodological individualism in light of, or the conundrums attached to, 
elementary set theory, Fine (2011).  
20  But see Fine (1997b) for the entitlement approach as embodying unresolved tensions 
between micro- and macro-analysis that have been reproduced throughout the famine 
literature. 
21 See also Martins (2011) for the notion that Sen incorporates a surplus approach derived 
from the Cambridge and classical traditions. This, however, begs the questions of the 
multiplicities of Cambridge, surplus and classical political economy traditions, let alone the 
other unavoidable influences upon or adopted by Sen himself that are not derived from these 
traditions whether by virtue of his personal trajectory (from India for example) or his 
gargantuan scholarship across economics, philosophy and more. 
22 Thereby, uncritically accepting himself the priority of the dualism between production and 
consumption despite otherwise appealing to surplus theory. 
23 See Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth (2010 and 2012), Fullbrook (2012), Ferguson (2010) 
and Mirowski (2010). 
24 See Mirowski (2012) and Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2012). 
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